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Abstract—Satellite navigation systems such as the
Global Positioning System (GPS) makes it possible
for users to find their relative or absolute position.
Thanks to its mobility and reliability, the GPS is used
in many civil and military applications. However, the
GPS does not provide an advanced level of security.
Therefore, it could be potentially a target of attacks.
With the development of new GPS attacks, the security
knowledge has to grow at the same rate, so existing
attacks can be detected by updated versions of receiver
software or hardware. In this paper, a comparative
analysis of GPS receiver resilience to software attacks
is performed with the help of GNSS simulator from
Spirent. The main objective of this work is to perform a
sensitivity analysis of variables involved in calculation
of position of the GPS receivers from different price
bands that might be targeted by existing or future
GPS attack. Variables making the biggest impact on
calculated position are determined using the model.
Experimentation validation of their influence is per-
formed using selected receivers and corrupted signals
generated by GNSS simulator. The testing is based on
tuning the selected variables in order to simulate the
theoretical error obtained from the sensitivity analy-
sis. The results obtained from testing are discussed
in order to analyse the behaviour of the considered
GNSS receivers (including the premium class ones)
and establish whether they provide a protection from
existing or potential GPS attacks.
Index Terms—GPS, Security, GNSS, RF Attacks,
Spoofing, GSS 7000, Spirent
I. Introduction
In a highly connected digital world, a reliable source
for absolute positioning, navigation and timing (PNT)
data is a clear need for many military and commercial
applications. Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)
are considered as an effective and efficient solution for
most of these needs. According to the 2017 GNSS Market
Report published by the European GNSS Agency [1], there
are 5 billion GNSS devices in use around the world and 8
billion are forecast by 2020. There are multiple GNSS such
as GLONASS [2], BeiDou [3] or Galileo [4]. Nevertheless,
the most commonly used one is the Global Positioning
System (GPS) [5].
This worldwide dependency on GNSS technology and
its application to safety critical operations illustrates the
need of an integrated and robust system. Notwithstanding,
every system has its own vulnerabilities and ways to
exploit them. In the past, GNSS have experienced both
intentional and unintentional attacks mainly exemplified
in jamming [6] and spoofing events [7, 8]. On the other
hand, there are more sophisticated attacks than jamming
and spoofing that can affect GNSS receivers. As seen in
[9], many vulnerabilities can be found in a GPS receiver
software. Attacks such as Middle-of-the-Earth, date de-
synchronization or specific operating system bugs are
described in this paper and their consequences can be
devastating depending on the receiver model.
All these attacks have triggered an extensive academic
research together with software and firmware updates for
commercial devices to meet the requirements of accuracy,
integrity, continuity and availability in relevant applica-
tions. Significant resources are being spent every year
to increase the security of these systems as described in
works [10, 11, 12]. The most common attacks, such as
jamming or spoofing pseudoranges, are already addressed
by high quality receivers [13] using, for example, GNSS
authentication which cannot be replicated as easily as the
current public GPS signal. Hence, these attack vectors are
not in the scope of this study.
In view of the present high interest to the improvement
of the resilience of the GNSS receivers to different type of
attacks, both present and future, the aim of this work is
to investigate the sensitivity of the software part of a GPS
receiver to the variation in the input variables that can
be affected by various external reasons, including attacks
on the GPS receiver. Novel results obtained here with use
of the Spirent GSS7000 GNSS simulator and a number
of commercially available receivers, allowing evaluation
of their resilience to existing and potential attacks and
discussing also challenges of such analysis.
II. Model and simulation
Fig. 1: Generic GPS receiver structure
The typical structure of the GPS receiver under test is
shown in Fig.1. While attacks in general can target differ-
ent blocks of the receiver to affect the position calculation,
effectiveness of these attacks depends on the hardware
realisation of the block in that particular receiver. The
main focus of this study is a more generic consideration
of GPS calculations in the Microprocessor Navigational
Solution block.
GPS PNT solutions rely on the ephemeris data of
each satellite involved in the computations. That data is
contained in the navigation message broadcast by satel-
lites. Independent analysis of every parameter contained
in the satellite’s navigation message is not practical.
Therefore, in order to achieve meaningful results using a
time-affordable method, a sensitivity analysis of the GPS
receiver inputs should be performed to assess the impact
of each independent variable on the position output.
A. Navigational Solution Block Model
A model of the Navigational Solution Block is required
to perform a sensitivity analysis. Therefore, a representa-
tive model has to be chosen to achieve realistic results.
Even though an actual GPS receiver software would be
the best option to perform the analysis, details of GPS
receiver software structure are usually not available due
to sensitivity of this information. This limitation led to
the choice of an open-source software model. The chosen
model is GoGPS, a software package designed to improve
the positioning accuracy of GPS devices [14, 15]. The
GoGPS model was originally developed in MatLab [16]. It
takes the information contained in the digitized GPS RF
signal as inputs and returns the messages in the format of
National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) that are
produced by many commercial receivers. Subsequently, the
model has been adapted to MatLab Simulink [17] making
easier the access to all the variables present in the com-
putations. The Simulink model is divided in four major
blocks corresponding to the natural steps for obtaining a
positioning solution from GPS signals described below:
Fig. 2: GoGPS model diagram [14]
Input block of the model takes all the ephemeris and
timing data that the receiver needs in order to calculate
its position. More information about these variables can
be found at Global Positioning System standard [5].
Atmospheric corrections block is subdivided into tro-
pospheric and ionospheric corrections parts. Klobuchar
model is used for the ionosphere modelling, reducing its
induced error by 50% [18]. Saastamoinen algorithm [19]
was used to recreate the tropospheric error. Improvements
could be added to get better accuracy from these errors.
However, a detailed study of the atmospheric corrections
influence on the positioning accuracy is out of scope of this
study.
Satellite calculations block represents the satellite posi-
tion calculations. Firstly, the relativistic error due to the
gravitational potential and the relative speed is calculated.
This error has relatively low order of magnitude. However,
it has a noticeable effect on the observed transmission time
due to the signal propagation speed. Secondly, the Earth’s
rotation also has to be taken into consideration as during
the transmission not only the satellite moves but the Earth
does as well.
Position calculation block takes every calculated infor-
mation from previous blocks in order to get the final
position of the receiver.
B. Simulation procedure
It can be seen from the above description of the software
blocks, some assumptions have been made. First, the
ephemeris data values used as input are decimal values.
Binary conversion is not made in the model, hence all the
possible errors related to this transformation are not taken
into account. Second, signal group delay is calculated from
assumption of working with L1 signal of GPS constella-
tion.
The output variable of the sensitivity analysis is the
distance from the centre of the Earth to the GPS receiver.
During the analysis the ephemeris input variables are
changed one by one and variation in the output variable
is logged. Only one satellite signal will be corrupted at
a time. A possible simultaneous variation of multiple
variables or multiple satellite signals corruption was not
considered in this study.
The input variables are varying within specific ranges
that depend on the variable itself and defined following
GPS standard of Positioning Service Signal Specification
[5]. The sensitivity analysis results are used then to per-
form an experimental validation as it will be described in
the next section.
III. Results
The results of the sensitivity analysis using the GoGPS
model [14] are obtained by Spirent software SimGen [20].
This software is able to control the simulated GNSS RF
signals generated by the simulator for the most compli-
cated GPS-based scenarios with inclusion of the satellite
constellation related effects, e.g. satellite movement.
Spirent’s SimGen software offers an opportunity to per-
form Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM)
that ensures the GPS signal integrity by monitoring and
analysing GPS measurements using redundant GPS sig-
nals [21].
Fig. 3: Experimental procedure
Since four satellites are needed to calculate the receiver
position, for RAIM implementation at least five are needed
to perform the comparison and detect a corrupted signal.
This technology may not be always available as five or
more healthy satellites must be available. In addition,
RAIM is not included in the simulated model. Therefore,
in order to make the experiments as similar as possible to
the simulation, RAIM was disabled in GPS receivers for all
experiments. An overview of the experimental procedure
is outlined in Fig. 3.
Once the key variables are identified from the sensi-
tivity analysis, experimental validation is the next step.
This procedure allowing confirmation of the theoretical
results from previous section using commercially available
receivers. In order to recreate the scenario close to the one
used in the sensitivity analysis, Spirent simulator GSS7000
[20] was used. This simulator allows creation of an RF
signal, representing designed scenario of a corrupted signal
which is fed to selected GPS receivers.
A. Sensitivity analysis results
The sensitivity analysis results show that three variables
demonstrate the highest level of influence on the position
calculation error: ω0, ω˙ and
√
A. Other variables are not
taken into account due to their low impact on the final
position calculations, with ionospheric and tropospheric
corrections making the smallest impact according to the
model. The results are summarized in Table I:
TABLE I: Sensitivity analysis results
Variable Description Maximum
error magni-
tude(m)
Error
description
Range of values
√
A Square root
of the semi
major axis
1011 Least square
solution
divided by
zero
[2537, 6557]
ω0 Longitude
of ascending
node of orbit
plane at
weekly epoch
1010 Least square
solution
divided by
zero
[-1,1]
ω˙ Rate of right
ascension
108 Argument of
latitude error
augmenta-
tion
[-9,54e-07, 9,54e-07]
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show how the output variable (dis-
tance from the center of the Earth to the GPS receiver)
varies with each input variable change. On the X axis, the
value of each variable is shown as a percentage of their
allowed range value. On the Y axis, the distance from the
center of the Earth is shown in meters.
Fig. 4: Sensitivity Analysis Result:
√
A
Fig. 5: Sensitivity Analysis Result: ω0
Fig. 6: Sensitivity Analysis Result: ω˙
Figures 4 and 5 show the effect of a corrupted value
on the GPS least square solution position calculation.
Corrupted values of
√
A and ω0 lead to problems in the
least square solution calculation. The noise-like behaviour
of the position error due to corrupted
√
A Several peaks
are found in the figure as the variable is used for only 1
satellite position calculation, which as an indirect effect on
the final receiver position determination, including terms
such as the relativistic clock error correction or the satellite
orbit calculation. During these calculations, a division by
zero makes the final position go to a very large number,
creating large peak visible in Fig. 5.
Variable ω˙ is the 3rd in the list of selected variables
with respect to the influence on position error. The error
in ω˙ affects the latitude calculation. The error propagates
through the receiver position calculation matrix and is
amplified by the Earth radius. Therefore, increase in the
value of this variable will lead to the variation shown in
Fig 6. Details on the receiver position calculation matrix
and corresponding calculations can be found in [5].
Other input variables that are not shown here have a
lower impact on the solution; therefore, they have not been
investigated further.
B. Experimental validation results
During the experiments four GPS receivers, both cheap
and expensive models, were considered. The character-
istics are summarised in the Table II, where horizontal
accuracy is mentioned with and without using Satellite-
based Augmentation System (SBAS) that improves the
accuracy of position estimation and will have a big impact
when performing small variable changes.
TABLE II: GPS Receiver details
Receiver (Rx) Price (Eur) H.Acc. (m) SBAS H.Acc. (m)
Rx 1 12000 1.2 0.6
Rx 2 7000 2 0.5
Rx 3 70 2.5 N/A
Rx 4 30 2.5 2
For the experimental validation three input variables
identified from the sensitivity analysis were uniformly
sampled between their minimum and maximum values
given by GPS signal specification [5]. In order to avoid
over-the-air interference direct wired connection between
the simulator and the GPS receiver was used.
Results of the validation were expressed in terms of
the errors relative to true position: geodetic latitude,
longitude and altitude (LLA) coordinates. For simplicity
true position was set to (0,0) at the Earth surface. The
errors were obtained by recording the maximum change
of the position after the change in the input variable.
Once the variables were set, Spirent’s PosApp applica-
tion was used to create the scenario with the requested
specifications.
IV. Analysis and Discussion
The position results are analyzed with respect to errors
relative to the true position. An error is detected when
the position error surpasses the tolerance defined by each
receiver’s accuracy specifications. Several types of errors
can be defined based on the observed results. They differ
by the possibility of the correction, correction source, time
required for correction and behaviour of the error in time:
1) Errors that are detected and fixed by the receiver
internally are denoted as ”Error detected”.
2) Errors that are fixed after some time e.g. after ob-
taining the almanac or in post-processing this error
is denoted as ”Temporary error”.
3) Errors that increase in time are reflected in the tables
as ”Increasing Error”.
4) Error combination is possible, as ”Temporary in-
creasing error” means an increasing error that is
fixed in time.
5) If the position switches between the correct and the
corrupted position for a certain amount of time to
finally converge to the correct position, ”Temporary
alternating error” is used in the table.
6) If the error cannot be corrected with the full almanac
data it is denoted in the Tables as ”Permanent error”.
The special case of the error is when receiver provides
no solution. This indicates that the error was detected,
but no solution is given to emphasize that the solution,
even if it can be calculated, is not trustworthy. Tables
III, IV and V summarizes the error performance of the
analysed GPS receivers against modifications in three in-
put variables identified from the sensitivity analysis using
predefined types of errors: types 1 to type 6, according to
the definition above) and also ”No solution” category.
TABLE III:
√
A effect
√
A 8191 0 6000 5400
Rx 1 Error
detected
Error
detected
Error
detected
No solution
given
Rx 2 Error
detected
Error
detected
Temporary
error
Temporary
error
Rx 3 Error
detected
Error
detected
Error
detected
Temporary
alternating
error
Rx 4 Error
detected
Error
detected
Temporary
error
Temporary
error
The colors of cells define the impact on the receiver cal-
culated position: white means no impact (error corrected
internally), yellow means a temporary impact and orange
a permanent impact. The selected values are the maximum
and minimum of each variable and values close to the one
that gives the non-corrupted position. This way, extremes
will be tested as well as little modifications.
TABLE IV: ω0 effect
ω0 -1 1 0 -0.018
Rx 1 Error
detected
Error
detected
Error
detected
No solution
given
Rx 2 Temporary
error
Error
detected
Error
detected
No solution
given
Rx 3 Temporary
error
Error
detected
Permanent
error
Permanent
error
Rx 4 Increasing
error
Temporary
increasing
error
Temporary
increasing
error
Increasing
error
TABLE V: ω˙ effect
ω˙ 0 4.76e-7 3.72e-9 -9.5e-7
Rx 1 Error
detected
Temporary
increasing
error
Increasing
error
No solution
given
Rx 2 Error
detected
Temporary
increasing
error
Increasing
error
Increasing
error
Rx 3 Error
detected
Temporary
increasing
error
Error
detected
Increasing
error
Rx 4 Increasing
error
Temporary
increasing
error
Temporary
increasing
error
Increasing
error
A. Analysis of parameter influence
Square root of A and ω0 values are continuously mon-
itored by the receivers. As they are key factors in the
satellite orbits, an error in these variables can lead to a
significant error in calculated position. This happens due
to assuming that the satellite is in a different position from
the true one; therefore, the transmission time will differ.
This error will propagate through the receiver position
calculations. The receiver is able to detect such misleading
information by two different ways:
1) Analyze the range of variables. If the value of the
input variable is out of the boundaries, the receiver
can fix the input.
2) Detect and exclude of satellite ephemeris corrupted
parameters by comparing them (integrity-checking)
against the almanac data.
Position error due to corruption in ω˙ differs to the
previous cases as it is a derivative variable. Hence, the
input variable is multiplied by time and sensitivity of the
output variable is not as straightforward as in previous
cases. On the other hand, if the input variable value is out
of range or differs from the almanac value by a big margin,
the error will be detected the same way as it was done in
the previous cases.
B. Comparison with simulation
When analyzing the experimental results, the compar-
ison between the experimental and theoretical results is
performed. Experimental results were calculated by ob-
taining the maximum difference in position by tuning each
variable. Once the variables values that give the maximum
error are selected, they are included in the simulated model
and the error in position is calculated. These differences
found are shown in the Table VI that shows the maximum
error induced in the receivers by tuning each variable.
TABLE VI: Error comparison
Error, (m)
√
A ω0 ω˙
Simulation 6000 80000 1500
Rx 1 N.S. N.S. 188 + 0.2pmin*
Rx 2 2 15* 60 + 0.3 pmin*
Rx 3 2 160 0.4 pmin
Rx 4 0.15 0.5 510
In this table, ”pmin” means per minute and * means
that the error may be fixed in time depending on the
satellite constellation changes. The corrupted satellite may
go out of range from the receiver. This would fix its
position calculation automatically because other, good
satellite data is used.
In general differences between errors in receivers outputs
and simulation results can be explained in first place
by absence of exact information about the GPS receiver
firmware that is a commercially sensitive information and
it is not disclosed by manufacturers. Other reasons can be
also given:
• Differences between simulation and experimentation
scenarios, e.g. the time variability or the number of
satellites. The final error in commercial receivers will
vary depending on the number of available satellites.
This is not realised in the Simulink model.
• Implemented GPS model is not able to process al-
manac data from other satellites during the simu-
lation. This information is used by real receivers to
check the received information from direct satellite
communications. In addition, the receivers are able
to perform a variable comparison between satellites,
detecting rapid changes due to GPS attacks or insta-
bilities and banning the problematic satellites.
• Numerical errors can be fixed in commercial GPS
receivers. This characteristic is not present in the GPS
model for simulation.
Post-processing is extensively used in commercially
available GPS receivers. Position errors based on compu-
tational issues such as the ones found in
√
A and ω0 are
not affecting experimentally investigated receivers, which
have methods to avoid these kind of errors. In addition,√
A is a variable whose corruption was already known in
the past as ”Middle-Earth Attack”.
GPS receivers are checking the variables against the
expected values. An initial comparison with the variable
limiting range is performed, followed by the almanac data
comparison. If any of these checks result in detecting of
a corrupted variable, the general behaviour is to exclude
the corrupted satellite from the position calculation.
Error based on derivative error propagation essentially
affects the experimental receivers. The order of magnitude
between the experimental and theoretical error does not
differ as much as in previous cases. In addition, this case
has an extra difference between theoretical and experimen-
tal: the GPS model error is fixed in time, while the error
from the experimental model raises with time. Therefore, if
the experiment was given infinite time and post-processing
is not used, the error would match the theoretical one.
As an example, the corruption of ω˙ is maximized when
it is equal to zero, as shown in Fig. 6. This fact affects
all receivers and, in case of receiver 4, the position error
exceeds 500 m (see table VI). The error in the receiver
output is within an order of magnitude difference from
the simulation results, that can be considered as relatively
good match, providing that model did not have any inter-
nal error corrections.
GPS receivers’ dependency on almanac data can be ex-
ploited as well. Potentially, the overall constellation can be
blocked and a new one can be simulated and broadcasted.
Therefore, almanac checking can be overcome.
V. Conclusions
By the comparison with the simulated results it was
found that many receivers are able to handle signals
with corrupted information on semi major axis (
√
A),
minimizing the position error or providing an indication
of the corruption by means of refusing to give a solution.
It can be seen from the results that this is due to extensive
internal post-processing of the results that allows to detect
and in many cases to correct an error.
The other two parameters: ω0 and ω˙ present significant
challenge to receivers in case of their corruption. The error
in position in these cases may reach hundreds of meters
and in case of ω˙ corruption may also increase with time.
Even when solution can be obtained it is frequently takes
longer to produce it.
It is not surprising that abilities of the receivers to
handle corruption of variables are depending on their
price. Cheaper Receivers 3 and 4 have more faulty cases in
comparison to more expensive Receivers 1 and 2. Receiver
2 is the one that is able to fix many errors. However, it is
not able to detect certain types of corruption. Hence, this
receiver is ideal for non-critical applications where an error
is not catastrophic. Receiver 1 has a really good capacity
to detect errors. The results show that it is able to detect
errors even if it is not able to fix them. The method of
detection is unknown though due to the lack of knowledge
about the receiver’s firmware. This receiver is ideal for
critical applications as it is able to cope with the majority
of the input corruption.
This work can be continued in the future by improving
the model used for sensitivity analysis in terms of its accu-
racy, handling almanac data and use of multiple satellites
for error reduction. The updated model can become a
useful tool for detecting existing vulnerabilities through
enhanced sensitivity analysis and developing solutions for
error detection and correction for future GNSS receivers.
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